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  China´s increasing presence in the African continent is intensely discussed both in 
the business and academic fields. Although China´s companies are not traditional 
investors in the continent, the history can still be traced back to the period just after 
the establishment of the People´s Republic of China. In recent years, the influence of 
the Chinese government and companies in Africa couldn´t be neglected any longer, 
which also goes hand-to-hand with controversies and accusations like neo-colonialism 
and debt-trap. Differing from traditional investors, observers always attribute China´s 
success in Africa to its strong state power. The Chinese government does have its role 
in the process, what is more important, however, could be the escalating collaboration 
between state power and companies. Mostly by qualitative approach, I list several 
methods by which China´s government could cooperate with overseas investors, 
particularly in Africa. Also in this paper, the transaction cost problem is selected as 
the theory lens to elaborate the reason why cooperation between government and 
firms is so important for Chinese African investment. 
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1 . Introduction 
China´s increasing presence in the African continent is intensely discussed both 
in the business and academic fields. Although China´s companies are not traditional 
investors in the continent, the history can still be traced back to the period just after 
the establishment of the People´s Republic of China. In recent years, the influence of 
the Chinese government and companies in Africa couldn´t be neglected any longer, 
which also goes hand-to-hand with controversies and accusations like neo-colonialism 
and debt-trap. In view of the significant role played by China´s state power, some 
people are blaming China´s government for undermining the fairness of the market. 
At the same time, more and more people are curious about how exactly does China´s 
government operate during the process so that Chinese companies could maximize 
ROI - Return on Investment in such a short term, compared with some traditional 
investors.  
The factors that influents the Chinese outward investment in Africa is a hot topic 
for academics. Dunning (2008) divides the outward investment into three types by 
different motivation: market, resource and efficiency seeking. Chinese investment can 
also be attributed to these three ones. In the report of Sanfilippo (2010), he indicates 
that Chinese firms tend to invest in Africa because of natural resource and potential 
market of the continent. Anyanwu and Yaméogo (2015) demonstrate their opinion 
about the factors which drive FDI flows to Africa, and they also identify whether they 
were policy or non-policy, “pull” or “push”, “demand side” or “supply side” and 
“institutional factors” or not. With reviews of selected literatures, they found that 
these factors are more considered as basic economic factors, trade and the exchange 
policies, and other factors of the investment environment from perspectives of both 
investors and recipients. Kolstad and Wiig (2011), for instance, use quantitative 
analysis with the establishment of econometric model to illustrate that the most 
dominant motivation for China is to access natural resources from Africa. Alden 
(2005) hold the similar opinion about Chinese resource-seeking investments in Africa, 
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
but he also emphasizes it would be a mistake to consider natural resource as the single 
motive to the relationship. He mentions four factors, including resource security, 
potential markets and investment opportunities, symbolic diplomacy and development 
cooperation, and strategic partnerships. Similar theme, but from the other perspective, 
is also discussed in the article of Dupasquier and Osakwe (2006), in which the authors 
noted that political and macroeconomic instability, lack of development, weak 
infrastructure, poor governance, inhospitable regulatory environments, and 
ill-conceived investment promotion strategies, are considered as key factors which 
impede FDI inflows to Africa from nearly all foreign investors.  
In terms of the impact of China´s participation in Africa, using the fixed-effects and 
instrumental variable approaches to 36 countries over the period 2003-2012, D. 
Adonsou and Lim (2018) indicate that Chinese FDI actually promote the development 
of personal income in Africa. And they mentioned that the explosion of Chinese FDI 
Africa is proceeded by different presidents´ visits to Africa. For example, a new 
relationship was established between China and Africa after then President Jiang 
Zemin´s tour in Africa in 1996, which shows that political interaction between two 
counterparts is the engine of economic cooperation at the early stage.  
Some writers discuss about the Chinese mode in Africa from all kinds of aspects. 
Vadra (2017) describes the so-called Angola-mode, which massively focuses on 
large-scale infrastructure and mining projects, as an interesting framework that China, 
specifically its SOEs, has utilized as this kind of business strategy on the continent, 
and the overwhelming majority of these SOEs are state-owned like Sinopec, etc. Ross 
(2019) explicitly addresses the role of institutions on Sino-Africa foreign direct 
investment. His results highlight that countries that are able to provide a stable 
political environment and effective control of corruption and other rent-seeking 
activities which exert the greatest effects on Chinese foreign direct investment. 
Eventually, they suggest three aspects of development to accelerate the development 
and maintain the sustainability of Chinese investment in Africa: the mechanisms to 
better control corruption, long-term political stability, and supply-side investment. In 
the paper of Yao, Sutherland and Chen (2010), the authors use the failure of Chinalco 
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1, as a case study to illustrate two theoretical propositions. First, the efforts of China´s 
big strategy to “go global” can be considered as being part of a “national 
power-building globalization strategy”. Second, thanks to the protection from the 
state power, China´s large SOEs could afford active economic activities and take 
much more risks than their foreign competitors could, when it comes to international 
investment.  
  From the theoretical perspective, economic history evolves with the process of 
gradual specialization, no matter geographical or occupational, which causes 
transaction cost problems from all kinds of aspects. For instance, because of the 
development of cross-border trade, there are two major transaction cost problems. 
One is a classical problem of agency, and the other one is contract negotiation and 
enforcement, particularly, in underdeveloped countries or regions.  
North (1991) Emphasizes the importance of transaction costs to enterprise-level 
economic activities. Due to the use of the market to allocate resources, when 
companies conduct economic exchanges, transaction costs are divided into two 
categories. The first set of transaction costs arises before the contract is concluded, 
including search costs, contract negotiations, and “government-imposed costs”. The 
second group of transaction costs is incurred to the company after the contract is 
concluded, including costs related to surveillance, compliance, and mandatory 
violations. In essence, transaction costs are caused by incomplete and asymmetry of 
information, and due to the uncertainty of the operating environment of recipient 
countries, the costs of multinational companies in foreign direct investment may 
increase. (Ross & Omar & Xu & Pandey, 2019)  
In this dissertation the major objective is to show how the cooperation between 
China´s government and companies can effectively reduce the transaction cost 











during these decades. For this purpose, and methodologically, this dissertation is 
based on two-fold literature review: theoretically on transaction costs and empirically 
on data and studies about Chinese involvement in Africa. In order to have a complete 
picture about this high-level cooperation, there is the systematically analysis of the 
evolution of policies published and implemented by both central and provincial 
government. It is also important to illustrate the development of relevant institutions 
and platforms related to Sino-African cooperation which play the role to reduce 
transaction cost caused by various factors. Differing form many articles focusing 
more on the motivations and results of China´s investment in Africa, this is the one 
whose emphasis is the whole process. For those emerging investors, it´s important to 
have a comprehensive view about the evolution and enforcement of the competitor 
like China with the unique political institution. For China, it´s also necessary to know 
how to balance the investment from public and private firms, increasing the 
participant of OFDI (Outward Foreign Direct Investment), so that it could have a 
sustainable development in Africa. 
The dissertation is structured as follows: section one is the overall introduction of 
the background and related literature; Section two is the introduction about the 
so-called “Chinese model” in Africa, including its evolutional history, distribution 
and so on; Section three and four describe actions taken by China´s government and 
firms respectively; Section six describes how do they cooperate with each other; 
Section seven is the conclusion and direction for further researches. 
2 . Chinese model in Africa 
  With the OECD´s standardized definition of aid as “official development 
assistance” (ODA), which is official financing given at concessional rates with a grant 
element of at least 10 to 45 percent depending on the developing country income 
classification, in order to promote economic development and people´s welfare there. 
In its framework, other official flows, such as preferential export credits, cannot be 
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considered as the part of the aid architecture, and military aid can´t be counted in as 
well. As a donor, China has played its role immediately since the establishment of the 
People´s Republic of China in 1949, particularly, in the African continent. Since the 
Chinese government so engaged in relationships with those African countries, closed 
diplomatic ties exist between China and its African friends, which is one of the most 
important factors that helps PRC to return to the United Nations as the only 
representative of China in 1971. In 1996, the then president Jiang Zemin´s tour of 
Africa initiates the new era of Sino-African relationship, which is different from the 
one during the period between 1963 and 1976, when China´s Africa policy was 
shaped by its ideological consideration. (Alden, 2005) Because of the sanction 
imposed by western world after Tiananmen Square Event and the on-going 
market-oriented reform, the country tries to embrace the outside world at that time 
with a more diversified diplomatic and economic objective. After 2000, because of 
the apparently arising worries about China´s emergence as a world power, 
government of PRC begins to promote the idea of China´s peaceful rise. (Alden, 2005) 
At the same time, along with the entry in WTO and other international organizations 
and the growing amount of cross-border commerce, votes from African countries 
have been crucial to Beijing. A good example is the winning of the host of the 
Olympic games in 2008.  
  In 2003, China, in a diplomatic move, invited eight African countries which still 
recognise the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the second ministerial conference of 
China-Africa Cooperation Forum. In 2018, 53 African countries and the Commission 
of African Union attended the Forum on China-African Cooperation, which means, 
by far, all the continent, except Eswatini (ex-Swaziland), engages in cooperation with 
China in all kinds of aspects. Currently, Eswatini is the only one African country that 
still maintains diplomatic relationship with Taiwan. Although the diplomatic 
competition between Beijing and Taipei is not as intense as it was in the past, a real 
“Quanjiafu”, a photo with all family members, still has significance for China.  
Just like what is mentioned by Deborah Brautigam (2010), China´s grant aid and 
zero-interest loans usually connect with broader diplomatic objectives. As one of the 
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major non-DAC donors, however, China has its own definition of foreign aid or 
"external assistance", which is still a controversial issue. It is related to another 
discussion, this is, the need to adjust current institutions and terms because of those 
emerging donors, like China. Meanwhile, China is establishing its own institutions in 
terms of foreign aid and investment, accompanied by state-level strategies, diversified 
financing channels, and relevant companies.  
In the report of Kitano and Harada (2014), the definition of China´s foreign aid is 
also a practical one, but they divide all points into six terms: “(1) grants and 
interests-free loans managed by the Ministry of Commerce, (2) grants managed by 
other departments responsible for foreign aid, (3) scholarships provided by the 
Ministry of Education, (4) the estimated amount of interest subsidies of concessional 
loans, as bilateral aid, and (6) the budget for international organizations.”  
In general, Chinese investment in Africa can be divided into three types: the first 
one is pure aid which always associates with diplomacy; the second one is export 
credits which mix diplomacy and business objectives in order to promote exports of 
goods or services from Chinese domestic companies; the third one is mixed. The 
latter two are often criticized as the “tying-aid”, which may reduce the efficiency and 
accountability of assistance.  
When it comes to economic and trade cooperation, there is a different methodology 
to do the grouping: traditional commerce, project contracting, and investment. The 
Chart 1 shows amount and different importance of each kind in 2017, which 













Although the overall FDI of major investors, including China, significantly reduces 
in 2018, the YoY growth rate of the Chinese FDI in Africa is the second highest 
among all destinations, up to 31,5%. When it comes to the proportion of total amount, 
however, it´s just 3,8% of Chinese OFDI in 2018. And in terms of the participation in 
total stock, the value is 2,3% which is much lower than those major destinations like 
North America and Europe. The following table shows that the net ODI towards 
Africa is around US$5,4 billion. Meanwhile, the volume of ODI towards Asia in 2018 
is more than US$10 billion, according the same source. 
Table 1 
Overseas Direct Investment in Africa (USD 10 000) 
COUNTRY OR 
REGION 





STOCK AT THE 
END OF 2018 
2017 2018 
ALGERIA -14053 17865 206286 
SUDAN 25487 5712 132507 
GUINEA 623 20317 74244 
MADAGASCAR 7120 5560 80335 
NIGERIA 13795 19470 245346 
SOUTH AFRICA 31736 64206 653168 
AFRICA 410500 538911 4610353 





















 When it comes to the distributional situations about Chinese outward investment 
in Africa, it is obvious that the investment tends to concentrate in particular countries 
and sectors. Currently, China has invested in 52 countries in Africa. From the 
perspective of the quantity of flow in 2018, DR Congo was the most important 
destination of Chinese direct investment, receiving more than US$640 million. In 
terms of stock of capital, however, the biggest one is South Africa, nearly US$6,5 
billion, followed by DR Congo, nearly US$4,4 billion. From perspective of stock, in 
2018, 85,1% of the total investment, which is up to US$36,74 billion, flows to five 
sectors, including construction (32.0%), mining (22,7%), manufacturing (13,0%), 
finance (11,0%), and leasing and business services (6,4%).2 Besides that, since China 
is a country which needs to feed over 1,4 billion people, and the investment towards 
the agricultural sector by land acquisitions cannot be ignored. In 2009, China's 
investment in Africa's agricultural sector was 30 million U.S. dollars. By 2013, this 
figure had increased to 127.26 million U.S. dollars, an increase of nearly 3.2 times in 
five years.3  
The distributional situation has been evolving, particularly after 2010. Sanfilippo 
(2010) indicates that, during the period 1979-2000, Chinese investors preferred to 
invest in manufacturing (especially textiles) and resource extraction (amounting to 74 
per cent of the total value of FDI). Due to increasing investment in 
telecommunications and construction industries which has historically occupied an 
important position in China’s investment in Africa, the tertiary sector has been 
becoming much more relevant from 2010. Currently, however, the dominant sector 
which attracts Chinese investment is construction of infrastructure, because of the 
overcapacity of construction materials inner domestic market. Meanwhile, we can 









contract values of Chinese companies´ construction projects in Africa. On the one 
hand, from 2000 to 2015 in which Chinese construction companies obtained the 
highest contracts from Africa in recent years, with a sharp increase that is more than 
500%; on the other hand, the 2018 is the third consecutive year that gross annual 
contract values of Chinese companies´ construction projects in Africa have declined, 
totaled US$48,84 billion, a 0.5% decrease from 2017. Just following Asia, Africa is 
the second largest project contracting market for China. However, in 2018, the 
amount of new-signed contract in Africa soared to more than $78.4 billion which is 
32,4% of the total amount. (MOFCOM, 2019)  
2.2. Institutions 
  In the article of Ross et al. (2019), the authors conclude that, after the empirical 
analysis, efficiency-seeking FDI has now gradually become the primary firm-level 
motivation of China´s FDI in Africa instead of resource-seeking FDI. This 
demonstrates that, with the development of China´s economy, so does the apparent 
strategic orientation of their investment patterns pay attention on investment quality 
and ROI. Because of market imperfection is inherent, particularly under the African 
instability in which the business environment is vulnerable, and institutions are 
underdeveloped, some specific state-level institutions established by home and 
recipient government, and international organizations could be mutually beneficial. 
From the perspective of Africa, lack of efficient institutions is likely to prevent 
recipients from fully utilizing the FDI. And for China, efficient institutions are 
important to reduce the transaction costs of Chinese firms´ investments, and at the 
same time, to monitor and improve the ROI (return of investments).  
  It was widely said that China doesn´t have an independent central agency related 
to foreign aid or investment. In fact, there are some subordinations of the Ministry of 
Commerce which play important roles during the operational process, including the 
Department of Western Asian and African Affairs, and the Department of Outward 
Investment and Economic Cooperation. Their jobs include: (1) collect and release 
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information, operating with the embassy of the locality; (2) operate the accountability 
of the outward investment; (3) cooperate with other departments involved in the state 
initiative, etc.   
  We mean institutions not only those established by Chinese government, but also 
the impact from China´s government on local institutions. Ross (2019) mentions in 
his article, for instance, that Chinese investors tend to prefer the stability of the 
recipient government, as this arguably replicates the sustainability of home countries´ 
investment and related policies. By the end of 2018, China has established a joint 
economic and trade committee or mixed committee mechanism with more than 50 
countries and sub-regional organizations in Africa to continue to play the role of 
economic and trade cooperation mechanisms. (MOFCOM, 2019) 
2.3. Financial instruments 
  In the report of Deborah Brautigam (2010), he lists three financial instruments that 
made observers confused: “(1) Preferential export buyer´s credits; (2) mixed Credits; 
and (3) natural resource-backed lines of credit”, which always occur in the cases of 
recipients rich in natural resources. Since the enlarged overseas investment, the 
sources of financing flows have been diversified a lot. The most relevant one is 
China´s Export-import Bank (Exim Bank), under orientation from the Ministry of 
Commerce, which administers the concessional loan program using subsidies from 
the public fiscal budget. Exim Bank is just one of three “policy banks” set up by the 
government to directly finance its development plans. The other two banks are the 
China Development Bank and China Agriculture Development Bank. Generally 
speaking, they have similar strategy, but different inclination. Moreover, China has 
developed diversified sources of official financing: equity funds; non-concessional 
loans; a growing mix of market-rate and preferential export buyer´s credits offered by 
policy banks; and other funds offered by commercial banks with public subsidies in 
order to support domestic companies´ overseas business activities. There is another 
public institution related to finance of the outward investment: China Export&Credit 
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Insurance Corporation (SINOSURE) which is also "policy-oriented" to meet the 
needs of economic globalization and the development of China´s outward business.  
  It is obvious that China´s government is relentlessly using financial methods to 
support Chinese companies making international businesses, like foreign acquisitions. 
For instance, after 2008, since the global financial crisis and subsequent economic 
downturn, Chinese companies began to actively seek new opportunities for more 
significant participation in foreign resource companies, often financially supported by 
state-owned banks´ generous credit offers. (Yao & Sutherland & Chen, 2010)  
  In 2018, because of constant impact by commodity price fluctuations and the US 
interest rate hike and reduction of balance sheet, some countries experienced 
temporary economic development difficulties like sharp decrease in foreign exchange 
income. Foreign debt risks in some countries tended to increase, and some projects 
were under suspension together with difficulties in the advancement of new projects. 
In some countries, the problem of arrears in construction projects is frequent, and 
some countries require local firms to have priority participating in government 
construction projects. They also have more strict requirements for cooperation models 
and technology transfer. Traditional construction subcontracting, construction general 
contracting, sovereign financing and other cooperation models cannot meet the 
current cooperation needs any longer. More and more African countries such as 
Angola and Nigeria have vigorously adopted the PPP model (public-private 
partnership) for infrastructure construction. 
  PPP model has been popular all over the world for a while, because these 
partnerships often work effectively when technology, innovation and efficiency of 
private sector combine with incentives offered by government to complete projects on 
time and within budget, which allocates risks between private and public entities. In 
developing countries, particularly in African countries, governments face various 
restrictions on borrowing money for important projects. In this case, private entity is 
selected with the process of open competitive bidding and needs to adopt some 
particular conditions from local governments like performance linked payments. 
Currently, more and more private capital from China has been participating in 
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investments in Africa with PPP model. The majority of these enterprises are from 
digital industry such as internet and telecommunication companies, which may 
accelerate the progress of digitalization and the development of logistics in the 
continent. In order to standardize the PPP model, both in internal and external market, 
China Public Private Partnerships Center (www.cpppc.org) was founded in 2014 
which is subordinate to the Ministry of Finance (MOF).  
3. Chinese government 
  When Chinese companies begun investing aboard, they could not match their 
western competitors at that moment, in terms of technology, management, logistics 
and other business operations. What´s more, when they started to seek investment 
opportunities beyond China´s national boundary, they lost their monopolistic 
positions in their own industries and they didn´t enjoy dominant market power they 
held within inner market any longer, so they needed extended state support. (Yao & 
Sutherland & Chen, 2010) 
3.1. Initiative from China´s government 
As is mentioned before, from the very beginning, China´s investment in Africa 
often is accompanied by diplomatic objectives. Therefore, the government plays an 
essential role as the state-level back-up by some incentive policies, consistently 
establishing platforms for all players. China has also been donating UN agencies 
targeting Africa and related agendas, such as the UN Trust Fund for African 
Development and the UN Environment Programme, which significantly increases its 
discourse power in terms of topics related to African issues within the UN framework.  
The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), attached to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, is one of the most enforceable institutions related to Chinese 
investment towards Africa, whose members contain 53 African Countries that have 
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diplomatic relations with China, the Commission of African Union, and China. In the 
FOCAC, the topics are not subject to business cooperation, which has expended to 
diversified fields. From the Beijing Action Plan generated in 2018, we can see there 
are many chances for both sides to have achievements, including politics, economy, 
social development, culture, and military. Referring to the economic aspect, within 
the FOCAC´s framework, China encourages diversified policy-based and 
developmental financial institutions with different inclinations. It offers, for instance, 
the “Special Loan for the Development of African SMEs” to enhance support for 
Sino-Africa industrial capacity cooperation which could “boost the industrialization 
of Africa”.  
3.2. Economic & Trade Cluster  
Another significant function of the Chinese government is to help domestic 
companies, including state-owned and private ones, to build industrial clusters in 
African countries, like the special economic zones and industrial parks, which can 
improve the convenience and efficiency for both Chinese firms and their counterparts. 
Meanwhile, the Chinese government engages in sharing its experience with African 
countries through technical assistance and personnel training. According to the list 
published by the official website of Foreign Economic Cooperation 
(www.fec.mofcom.gov.cn), currently there are four approved economic cooperation 
zones operated by Chinese companies in Africa. Besides those clusters which gather 
factories from the same province or the homogeneous industry, there are some 
different forms. 
For example, the first phase Djibouti International Free Trade Zone (DIFTZ) has 
launched in 2018 with the help of China, which is a $3.5 billion project with the area 
of 4,800 hectares. The $370 million pilot zone covers an area of 240 hectares and 
includes four industrial clusters, with diversified sectors including trade and logistics, 
export processing, business and financial support services, and manufacturing and 
duty-free products retail. Located at the interaction of the Red Sea and the Gulf of 
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Aden in the Horn of Africa, DIFTZ is the largest international free trade zone in 
Africa, managed by Djibouti and three Chinese companies: China Merchants Group, 
Dalian Port Authority and IZP which is a cross-border trade and big data company. 
Besides the free trade zone in Djibouti, in terms of infrastructure, between Djibouti 
and landlocked Addis Ababa (the capital city of Ethiopia), a 756-kilometer (470 miles) 
railway was built by China, which costs up to $4 billion and makes DIFTZ an 
important entrance of African market.  
3.3. Financial Support  
Besides some state-level initiatives and diplomatic operation, financial back-up is 
another effective tool utilized by China´s government. In the case of natural resources 
and infrastructure, in particular, the state and SOEs have to work together to 
simultaneously achieve both private and social goals. Those SOEs always have 
relative soft budget limitation financially backed up by China´s central and provincial 
government, particularly through easily attained low cost bank credit, provided via 
state-owned financial system. (Yao & Sutherland & Chen, 2010) And there is a new 
trend, recently, the Chinese government has a pledge of zero-tariff treatment for 97% 
of tax items from African LDCs having diplomatic relations, which is related to the 
strategy of the Chinese government to internationalize its currency and reduce 
influence and restriction from the greenback by abandoning SWIFT system during the 
transaction which enables the US government to monitor.  
3.4. Accountability 
Many individuals hold negative attitudes towards Chinese investment. It is one of 
the widespread accusations about investments or aid from China: the capital from 
China often supports corruption and lacks accountability. Chinese government needs 
to confess that it is supposed to take more explicit methods to reduce the suspicions 
rather than blaming others for harboring negative attitudes.  
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Because of the complex finance system and the poor release of data, the 
transparency of Chinese outward investment is a major concern of observers. In 
addition, due to the lack of development financing data and poor management, the 
gap between de facto development financing providers and the international reporting 
system designed to track their activities is increasing. (Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange, 
and Tierney, 2018) In the report published by OECD, the author, Davies (2013), 
suggests that, in order to increase the transparency of country´s policies towards 
outward investment, more detailed and understandable OFDI data could be published 
on a regular basis. The growth of Chinese OFDI has been so rapid that it has been 
insufficient to have just a periodically statistical reporting. In 2003, MOFCOM 
established a single website focusing on FDI news and data (www.fdi.gov.cn). The 
website, however, was originally conceived as an inward investment promotion tool. 
It does contain limited information about outward investment activities, but it still 
focuses more on inward ones.  
Currently, as the major end-user of MOFCOM and SAFE statistics, National 
Bureau of Statistics has been publishing China´s OFDI data in its annual statistical 
yearbook and the website with the name of “Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation”. In order to offer a more clarified information publicity, the department 
of outward investment and economic cooperation established a separate website 
exclusively for China´s OFDI (www.fec.mofcom.gov.cn) which contains data, laws, 
introduction and consulting service, etc.  
Institutional problems and limitations related to the accountability are risky not 
only for receiving countries but also for Chinese companies and government, and, to 
some extent, it restricts the development of foreign investment. Currently, several 
related departments are involved in the system of supervision, including the Ministry 
of Commerce, the People's Bank, the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission, the China Banking Regulatory Commission, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission, and 
the Foreign Exchange Bureau. Resulting from the diversity of investments, Chinese 
government tends to focus on the monitoring and evaluation during the process and 
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after the project. Every project needs to be put on the record in advance. In order to be 
more efficient and comprehensive, Chinese government designates its supervision as 
“Dual spot check, Single release” which means, in the process of supervision, 
randomly selected law enforcement inspectors will be responsible for randomly 
selected inspection objects, and the investigation results will be released to the public. 
Meanwhile, the government will impose some constraints over those companies with 
bad credit history, like strengthening the audit of theirs loan application.   
At the same time, the government created strong environmental and social policies 
together with recipients to maximize the benefits of investments for both sides. In the 
report from Leung and Zhou (2014) of the World Resources Institute, the authors 
keep exploring this issue by examining the rapid increasing in financial outflows from 
emerging economies, including China and Brazil, and conclude that there are certain 
requirements for sustainable development, including supervision by regulatory 
agencies of lending and recipient countries; clean regulations; cooperation between 
actors involved; transparent processes of decision-making and operation; and 
negotiation process with affected people, obviously, which requires efforts from 
investor and recipient to “anticipate, identify, and mitigate harm.” 
3.5. High-tech instruments and Military Force 
Although the central government consistently keeps enthusiasm on Sino-African 
relationship, local or provincial governments still hold different attitudes towards 
investment in Africa. For some backward provinces, especially at early stage, they 
were not as enthusiastic as central level was, because the investment of both public 
and private investors, in an unstable environment like Africa, would make provincial 
governments more risk-taking.  
According to data from National Bureau of Statistic of China, now there are more 
than 200,000 Chinese workers working in Africa.4 In 2018, the top 5 destination of 
Chinese workers are Algeria, Angola, Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia with around 58% 

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of total in Africa, and Algeria alone accounts for 30% of total. The number of all 
Chinese citizens in Africa continent is close to 300,000. The following table shows 
the situation of recent years in terms of workers abroad, from which we can see that, 
by the end of 2018, the total number of persons abroad is close to 1,000,000. The 
number of Chinese labors in Africa accounts for 30% of total overseas labors, which 
is a significant participation.  
Table 2 
Statistics of Dispatched labor and Persons abroad in Contracted Projects and 
Labor Services during 2016-2018 
YEAR CONTRACTED PROJECTS LABOR SERVICES 
Dispatched labor 
(10 000 persons) 
Persons abroad by 
the end of year 
(10 000 persons) 
Dispatched labor 
(10 000 persons) 
Persons abroad by 
the end of year 
(10 000 persons) 
2016 23.02 37.29 26.40 59.60 
2017 22.21 37.68 30.02 60.23 
2018 22.70 39.07 26.50 60.61 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 
With a huge amount of labors in Africa, Beijing and local governments have to pay 
more attention on protecting overseas nationals, especially in some African countries 
with frequent incidents like coup d’état, kidnapping and vandalism. The latest 
China-Africa Action Plan (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan, 
2018) states that the “security of major domestic economic projects” and “safety of 
Chinese nationals, Chinese companies, and major projects” will be more important by 
enhancing intelligence and military cooperation of two sides. In 2018, Uganda 
deployed its military force to provent Chinese interests from being injured by locals. 
It is the first African country which takes explicit action like this. (Birybarema, 2018) 
In its neighbor country Kenya, a specialized police division was set up to safeguard 
the Mombasa-Nairobi railway. What´s more, in order to reduce threats to its 
investment, some technological methods, like facial recognition, are provided by 
Chinese companies to enhance local intelligence collection, surveillance and response 
capabilities. A bilateral agreement has been signed with Zimbabwe to deploy facial 
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recognition software from Chinese tech company CloudWalk in the capital city 
Harare. From the perspective of Beijing, it could train its algorithms on Africans to 
diversify the datasets. Meanwhile, the advanced technology can be used to improve 
the public security, from the perspective of Zimbabwe. In Angola and Ethiopia, we 
can easily find equipment from same company. 
  Besides that, China´s military force is also increasing the presence in the African 
continent to protect its economic and strategic interests, in particular activities related 
to the Belt and Road Initiative. In 2015, a law passed by China´s legislative body that 
allows to deploy the People´s Liberation Army (PLA) and People´s Armed Police 
outside China´s national boundary. Two years later, Beijing installed its first naval 
base abroad in Djibouti, targeting at active piracy in the Gulf of Aden. China also 
seeks to establish naval facilities in the Namibian Walvis Bay port with the “Djibouti 
model” stated by local press. (Nantulya, 2019) In addition, the PLA Navy periodically 
visits ports in Cameroon, Nigeria, Ghana, the Ivory Coast and Guinea in the name of 
Anti-Piracy Task Forces. In order to further realize the institutionalization in the 
military cooperation with African counterparts, the office for International Military 
Cooperation of the Central Military Commission was founded in 2016. By far, 
however, the Chinese military force abroad still tries to keep a low profile to reduce 
concern about whether China tend to abandon the “Peaceful Rising” strategy in the 
future.  
4. Chinese companies 
  In general, Chinese companies involved in the investment towards Africa can be 
divided by their forms of ownership. Public-owned companies tend to access to some 
specific sectors, like construction and resources extractive industries. For private ones, 
however, it´s hard to compete in these sectors which have plenty of requirements over 
capital, technology, and human resource. Therefore, private companies are inclined to 
invest in manufacturing and services. Kaplinsky and Morris (2009), in their report, 




groups related to natural resource or infrastructure construction, which are often 
connected with tying-aid packages and loans offered by the state finance system. The 
second type is companies which are related to more diversified fields, including 
manufacturing, telecommunication equipment and wholesale trade, and the majority 
of them are small- and medium- private businesses. 
It´s true that when it comes to large-scale projects, public-owned enterprises have 
absolute dominance, especially in energy and construction business. China´s state oil 
company, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), for instance, has invested 
significantly to establish connection with national petroleum and natural gas 
companies in Sudan, Angola, Algeria and Gabon, etc. (Alden, 2005) Chinese 
state-owned company can efficiently build ties to the natural resources system in 
specific African countries by methods like acquisition of share, providing technical 
assistance and human capital, etc. In terms of size, small and medium private 
enterprises are the majority of all kinds of participants. 
Mathews (2006) divides the development of MNEs (multinational enterprises) from 
the emergent world as two waves. The first wave MNEs, documented by authors such 
as Kumar and Mcleod (1981)5, Wells (1983)6 and Lall (1983)7, “success in oversea 
markets was due as much to the difficulties encountered at home countries (such as 
market restrictions and export difficulties) as to the incentives driving going out”. But 
the second wave is totally different, which is more about “pull” factors rather than 
“push” factors before. As Yeung (2000)8 puts it: The rise of second-wave MNEs 

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from emerging countries “is less driven by cost factors per se, but more by a search 
for markets and technological innovations to compete successfully in the global 
economy.”  
  And in what concerns to China, Gu (2009) mentions that there are three major 
reasons for Chinese company to invest in Africa. First, they go to start up 
development projects through state-level initiative; Second, some textile 
manufacturers establish processing factories in Africa, so that it could be more 
convenient for them to sell products locally. At the same time, by changing the 
country of origin, so that they could utilize the preferential trade agreements between 
the United States and the European Union with Africa in order to get rid of the 
protectionist restrictions on products from Mainland China; Third, some firms related 
to natural resource extraction go to Africa for the richer reserve, including crude oil, 
gas and mine, etc. Differing from the first stage (1949-1980s) of Chinese companies’ 
investment evolvement in Africa, nowadays the private firms, rather than 
governmental ones, are increasingly becoming the engine of economic activities 
between two counterparts, and they are involved in various sectors. After 2005, 
Chinese companies, especially private ones, began to find some alternative 
investment destinations overseas, in order to seek an escape from the growing 
pressure of surplus production and inner competition, particularly in some emerging 
markets like South Eastern Asia and Africa, in which they could explore stronger 
potential market with less intense competition. One of the main competition factors 
being the price.  
4.1. Localization of Chinese firms in Africa 
Because of different language and culture, localization is a serious problem for 
Chinese companies, which is also a major concern about China´s investment in Africa. 
What was consistently criticized by many is that Chinese companies often use 
Chinese workforces instead of locals. From some reports, however, we can also find 
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different opinions. In the article by Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong (2015), they 
analyze the localization rates at China-related enterprises and projects among African 
states, and they find that there is some variation among countries, resulting in 
different levels of localization. Companies and projects in Angola and Algeria have 
lower localization rates (using fewer local labors than average, but still a majority). In 
Angola, the reason is the de-skilling problem because of 27-year civil war. In Algeria, 
the reason is brain drain to Europe. South Africa and Zimbabwe´s higher 
industrialization and education levels result in better localization level at Chinese 
firms there. For those labor-intensified industries, such as manufacturing and 
construction, it is impossible to hire lots of employees coming from China. In this 
sense, localizing is one of the most critical steps for them, which can also benefit 
companies in many other aspects: lower cost, improved relations with local 
government, and local knowledge and familiarity. In Madagascar, for instance, 
Razafindrevonona et al. (2008) calculate that, during 2000-2006, Chinese companies 
contributed 10% of the total employment created by foreign multinational companies. 
Onjala (2008) reports that, in Kenya, local employment accounts for 96% of the total 
new jobs created by Chinese FDI, Meanwhile, Edinger and Burke (2008) report that 
the Chinese SOE Baosteel, one of the world’s top players in the steel industry, has 
invested around $300 million in the mining industry, creating about 2,000 new jobs 
for locals in Zimbabwe. Despite that, and for all companies from the rest of the world, 
it is unavoidable to face some backwards, including cultural conflicts, different work 
pace, and less specialization and discipline. Firms need to find a way to reach a 
balance. 
4.2. Collecting Intelligence  
Besides information published by the government, it is necessary for companies 
engaging in Africa to pay attention to the commodity price which possesses a 
significant impact on the fiscal policy of the majority of African countries, especially 
for those Chinese firms deeply involved in. Data from the IMF shows that the price of 
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commodities has been fluctuating sharply during recent years. For example, in terms 
of crude oil, its price dropped to the lowest point in the recent decade in January 2016: 
$36.44 per barrel. In June of 2014, however, the price was $113.48. Because of the 
significant decline, commodity-dependent countries face huge deficits. Angola, 
Ghana, and Zambia, for instance, applied for bailout loans from IMF. South Africa, 
whose largest exports are iron ore, coal, gold, and other minerals, was also impacted 
by the fall. During the presentation of the annual budget for 2016, the government 
announced unprecedented spending out of 25 billion rands (Ighobor, 2017). 
Nevertheless, it may be good news for some countries. Kenya, Rwanda, and Tanzania, 
for instance, are major oil importers in Africa, which means these countries may have 
more budget for other projects, like the construction of infrastructure.  
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Source: https://www.macrotrends.net 
  The price of commodities and crude oil is just a part of those information that are 
crucial for investors. In the report of Gu (2009), he illustrates the most important 
constraints for Chinese investors in Africa. The top five relevant factors include: 
“customs and trade regulations, quality of electricity, transportation, inflation and 
exchange rates and labor regulations.” Differing from big name public companies 
engaged in natural resources and constructions which care more about 
macroeconomic situation of the area, these factors about local business environment 
are more visible for SMEs.  
The collection and analysis of such information and data related to the investment 
climate is essential for companies to invest in Africa, even though you could learn 
some of them from Central government´s publication and Chinese Embassies in 
Africa. Gu (2009) draws a series of conclusions targeting at constraints of Chinese 
investors when they invest in Africa, particularly those small and medium private 
companies. According to his survey, the most important sources of information are 
obtained via social networking and one´s own experience and related research, which 
are relatively more significant for those SMEs investing in Africa than information 
from central government, embassies in Africa and local business community networks. 
Moreover, the less important source chosen by the Chinese investors is the local 
government and other firms in the area.  
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  People who wants to invest in Africa needs to have not only entrepreneurship, but 
also demands insights about your targeted market to develop more diversified 
business strategies. For example, there are several private security companies which 
are significantly present in the process of “going out” and BRI. For example, DeWe 
Security and Frontier Services is one of the major Chinese security contractors. Its 
work is to provide consultation and human resource to secure Chinese investors 
interests. In some special cases, employees of security companies need to provide 
more overt solutions as was the case of the rescue of 29 Chinese hostages in Sudan´s 
Kordofan State in 2012. Some of the employees employed by DeWe are former 
People's Liberation Army soldiers who rescued 300 Chinese oil workers captured in a 
gun battle between rival militias in the South Sudanese capital Juba in 2016.  
5. How do they cooperate? 
  In the past, referring to the strategy in Africa, many say that there is an apparent 
gap between policy formulation and policy implementation. Usually, the policy was 
made without subsequent and effective enforcement, including relative institutions 
and mechanisms and standard operation procedures. For example, many investors 
didn´t register within the framework of central government because they fear the 
many complex steps. Many of them thought that registration with government would 
generate more troubles than benefits. In the interview of Gu (2009) made in 2009, 
when representatives from Chinese firms were asked about the explicit methods could 
be taken by Chinese government to support their businesses in Africa. The key issues 
were listed as the following order: (1) The local Chinese embassy and other official 
organizations are required to provide active support for investment. (2) “More 
bilateral or multilateral free trade agreements.” (3) Simplified procedures and 
regulations for Chinese companies to invest overseas and obtain the capital needed for 




For Chinese companies, on the one hand, they choose to do business in countries 
with huge market potential but, on the other hand, it also means they need more 
political support from the central government to secure business environment and 
property rights. Here are major methods: 
(1) State-level platforms established by bi- and multilateral governments, which 
facilitates companies to obtain immediate information. Besides the Belt and 
Road Initiative and FOCAC, there is another state-level platform related to 
commercial cooperation with African countries: China International Import 
Expo (CIIE), which can provide those African exporters with a regular 
mechanism to promote their products, particularly of manufacturers from 
African countries. Another important method is bi- and multilateral Free Trade 
Agreement. By far, China has signed 17 FTAs with 25 countries and regions. It 
just signed the FTA with Mauritius in 2019, which is the first one signed with 
an African partner. In the framework of FTA, China and Mauritius will have 
deepened interaction in terms of trade in goods, trade in services and financial 
investments.  
(2) State-level assistance programs. In 2015, MOFCOM published «Measures for 
the qualification identification of enterprises for foreign aid projects», so that 
relevant companies can participate in the Chinese foreign aid program by 
official bidding and accountability. According to “Measures”, there are specific 
restrictions for companies´ qualification, including tax, social credit and past 
performance etc.  
(3) Financial instruments. Three “policy banks” set up by the government to 
directly finance its development plans, including EXIM Bank, China 
Development Bank and China Agriculture Development Bank. Moreover, 
China Export&Credit Insurance Corporation (SINOSURE) is a 
"policy-oriented" financial institution to meet the needs of economic 
globalization and the development of China´s outward business. Also, there are 
more and more diversified funds offered by commercial banks with public 
subsidies in order to support domestic companies´ overseas business activities.  
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(4) Assist companies to build clusters. Local business clusters will result in the 
significant improvement of productivity, which also benefits the future 
strategic management of the Chinese investment in Africa. Currently, there are 
some large-scale business clusters disperse on the African continent. Some 
clusters, for instance, are made up of diverse companies from the same 
province in China, and they engage in different industries, including textiles, 
garments, and wood processing, etc. A cluster combined with a collective 
living area can also protect employees from the instability in some African 
countries. According to the list published by the official website of Foreign 
Economic Cooperation (www.fec.mofcom.gov.cn), currently, there are four 
approved economic cooperation zones operated by Chinese companies in 
Africa: Zambia-China Economic & Trade Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ) in 
Zambia, operated by China Nonferrous Metal Mining Co., Ltd. (CNMC); 
TEDA SUEZ Economic & Trade Cooperation Zone in Egypt; China-Africa 
Lekki free trade zone in Nigeria; Ethiopian Eastern Industry Zone in Ethiopia. 
(5) Accountability mechanism. Currently, several related departments are involved 
in the system of supervision, including the Ministry of Commerce, People's 
Bank, State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, China 
Banking Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission, 
China Insurance Regulatory Commission, and Foreign Exchange Bureau. 
China´s government is establishing a comprehensive platform for the whole 
accountability, including monitoring of credit, bidding and projects checkout 
etc. 
(6) Security issue of Chinese labor and property. In the main African destinations 
of Chinese investment like Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe, China´s 
government has signed agreements with local governments in terms of 
protection of Chinese interests through local military or police force. 
Meanwhile, China also exports some technologies and skilled professionals 
related to security issue including facial recognition and hiring ex-PLAs to 
protect its foreign nationals´ security.  
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(7) Scholarships and Confucius institutes. According to the annual Global 
Education Monitoring Report 2020 produced by UNESCO, China´s 
government was set to offer 12,000 scholarships to sub-Saharan African 
students, through various agencies, which is the largest provider in the Top 50 
in which government initiatives dominate scholarships provision targeting 
African students. The scholarship gives more African students opportunities to 
study in China, and some Chinese firms would like to join in. Alibaba, for 
instance, offers several internship positions just for students from Africa. 
There are overall 61 Confucius institutes and 48 Confucius classrooms in 46 
African countries for African students who might be interested in learning 
Chinese or knowing more about Chinese culture. Also, it´s a platform for 
cultural exchange between China and African friends. From the perspective of 
firms´ investment in Africa, it´s better for them to employ local workers who 
can speak Chinese.  
6.Conclusion and further research 
  China´s government has been infiltrating its state power into every detail of the 
whole process of Chinese investment in African markets, because of some unusual 
factors existing in some of those countries. The majority of these methods is designed, 
intentionally or coincidentally, to reduce the transaction costs arising with the 
growing investments in Africa from Chinese public-owned and private firms. For 
example, the set of FOCAC and the International Import EXPO and other similar 
platforms is to solve the problem of asymmetry information caused by long distance, 
different language and diverse culture. At the same time, the periodical gathering 
could effectively remove searching cost, negotiating cost and enforcement cost. The 
bilateral and multilateral accountability mechanisms established by counterparts could, 
to a large extent, reduce contracting cost and monitoring cost, eliminating 
rent-seeking activities. The responsibility of state-owned financial institutions is to 
decrease financing cost and risks taken by those companies if they have needs during 
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their overseas invest process. The military forces and technological methods are 
deployed in order to improve the enforcement efficiency and avoid unnecessary lose.  
  It is important for everyone to know that China´s unique political and societal 
system is the foundation of its state power, combining with its leaders´ 
entrepreneurship for going out, which are objective and subjective factors. However, 
as an emerging investor, it has some obvious drawbacks and hidden dangers: 
  First, the unevenness is pretty obvious between the competitiveness of 
public-owned and private companies. It´s a common idea that private firms have a 
weak position in China, which also has expended to the overseas market. Public 
companies have a stronger capability to access some particular sectors like 
construction and energy which need plenty of capital and human resources to underlie 
the bid. In order to balance, public institutions tend to offer more opportunities to 
those mature private firms.   
  Second, it´s a tough and critical mission to deal with the concerns of local NGOs, 
civil or social groups and the worries of ordinary Africans, which also need the 
bilateral effort, from both government and companies. Besides the project contracting 
of infrastructure, the Chinese government and companies are planning to increase 
attention on the direct investment, operating local factories to manufacture and export 
products, which could improve the repayment capacity of local governments and hire 
more local employees. Meanwhile, companies with the intention to have long-term 
development in Africa, cannot ignore the concerns about the environment and labor 
rights.     
  Third, outsiders would be worried about the transparency and accountability of 
Chinese companies, particularly when it comes to high-tech products. The CloudWalk, 
for instance, would be requested to be more transparent in the way it stores and uses 
Zimbabweans´ facial information. With the increasing investments in 
telecommunication and AI across the African continent, there are more and more 




Fourth, the Chinese government is facing with many strong competitors, including 
the USA, Japan, Russia, and Brazil, etc. Comparing with China, these players also 
have their own advantages. America and Japan are traditional donors and have 
engaged in diversified business activities for a long time, with mature institutions, in 
Africa. Russia and Brazil also specialize in different industries. What´s more, the 
American federal government underlies its development financial institution OPIC 
which helps U.S. businesses gain footholds in the emerging market, providing 
investors with financing, political risk insurance, and support for private equity 
investment funds. The Blue Dot Network was just jointly launched by America, Japan 
and Australia, which also relates to infrastructure in emerging countries. 
For further research, there are certain directions related to this topic. The most 
important method is to conduct interviews with Chinese investors in Africa, including 
those from both public and private sectors or large and small firms. Questions are 
mainly focusing on their feelings about China´s government´s role within their 
investments. By establishing an evaluation mechanism, we could know more about 
their views in terms of several aspects such as registration, transparency of bidding, 
information publicity, financial back-up and accountability mechanism. One more 
question is related to their feelings about the evolution of cooperation between 
government and firms, setback or improvement, during this decade.  
Just as Kolstad and Wiig (2011) mention in their article that since the high-level 
integration of aid, trade and FDI in the package of Chinese investments, it´s important 
to consider the more comprehensive impact instead of different investments flows 
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